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We build a simple analytical general equilibrium model and linearize it, to find a closed-from expression
for the effect of a small change in carbon tax on leakage – the increase in emissions elsewhere.  The
model has two goods produced in two sectors or regions. Many identical consumers buy both goods
using income from a fixed stock of capital that is mobile between sectors. An increase in one sector’s
carbon tax raises the price of its output, so consumption shifts to the other good, causing positive carbon
leakage.  However, the taxed sector substitutes away from carbon into capital.  It thus absorbs capital,
which shrinks the other sector, causing negative leakage. This latter effect could swamp the former,
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baylis@illinois.eduA common concern with a unilateral pollution restriction is that one country’s 
abatement will be offset by “leakage”, defined as the increase in pollution elsewhere.  
Within a country as well, cap-and-trade may apply only to one sector such as electricity, 
which raises its price and shifts consumption to goods produced in other unregulated 
sectors.  Purely domestic leakage may offset some of the regulated sector’s abatement. 
In an international context, even without international capital flows, the regulating 
country puts itself at a competitive disadvantage.  International capital mobility is 
thought to make leakage worse, if investment flees the taxed region to help produce 
more polluting output in the other region.  In the context of climate policy, carbon 
leakage is a particular concern due to the global impacts of greenhouse gases.   
The literature has many estimates for carbon leakage associated with the Kyoto 
Protocol.  For instance, Paltsev (2001) finds a leakage rate of 10%, whereas Babiker 
(2005) finds rates as high as 130%.  In that case, a carbon tax in one country raises 
worldwide emissions.  More typical of other recent estimates, Elliott et al. (2010) find a 
20% carbon leakage rate from the Annex-B Kyoto countries. 
Given this presumption that leakage is positive, academics have searched for 
particular cases with counter-intuitive results.  We cannot review all such literature, but 
we list a few examples.  First, Felder and Rutherford (1993) build a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model with five regions and ten-year intervals, finding that marginal 
leakage can be negative after several decades if the carbon tax leaves enough unused oil 
to delay the other region’s introduction of carbon-intensive synthetic fuel.  Second, 
Copeland and Taylor (2005) show how negative leakage can arise through endogenous 
policy: in response to a cut in one region’s emissions, the other region experiences 
income gains that induce them to choose more environmental quality by raising their 
own pollution tax.  Third, negative leakage can arise through endogenous technology: 
the carbon tax may induce R&D into new abatement technology that can be used by the 
unregulated sector, especially if patents are poorly protected.
1  Fourth, Karp (2010) 
follows Chua (2003) to find negative leakage in an “extreme example” with particular 
cross-price elasticities among three inputs (such as labor, capital, and emissions).
2  
                                                 
1 See Golombek and Hoel (2004), Di Maria and Smulders (2004), Gerlagh and Kuik (2007), and Di 
Maria and van der Werf (2008).  Each makes particular points, which we cannot review here. 
2 In Karp’s example, production is highly labor intensive, but the carbon tax induces much substitution 
into capital, so it can reduce the return to labor, promote production, and reduce import demand for the 
dirty good.  In a closed economy, Fullerton and Heutel (2007) show that such special cases can generate 
other perverse results; a carbon tax can even raise emissions in the taxed sector.   - 2 - 
 
In this note, we demonstrate a substantial negative effect on leakage that has not 
been identified in existing literature, using a very general and simple model without 
special cases, particular parameters, endogenous policy, or induced technology change.  
Indeed, the model is a very standard analytical general equilibrium model with only two 
competitive sectors that each use carbon and one other input, with constant returns to 
scale.  Then a carbon tax always raises costs in that sector.  We derive expressions that 
show exactly when the negative effect on leakage in this model could swamp the 
positive effect, such that global carbon emissions fall by more than in the taxed sector.  
Our model can be taken to represent two countries that each produces one good, 
or a closed economy that produces two outputs.  For instance, the carbon policy could 
apply to electricity generation and not other goods, or it could apply in only one region 
within a country.
3  Many identical consumers earn income from a fixed stock of capital, 
and they receive rebate of all tax revenue.  Positive leakage arises when consumers 
substitute from the taxed country or sector’s output to the other output.  If the context 
were two countries that produce the same traded good (like steel from the U.S. or 
China), then a carbon tax in one country always increases imports and leakage.   
To find a negative leakage effect, we use three reasonable, general assumptions.  
First, the two goods are not perfect substitutes. Consumers still cause leakage when they 
substitute into the untaxed good, but not perfectly via infinite elasticity of substitution.  
Second, we assume that the firm has some ability to substitute out of carbon and into 
the other input (which can be labor, capital, or a composite of both).  The elasticity of 
substitution in production is not zero, so firms can reduce carbon per unit of output by 
using ‘abatement resources.’ Third, the clean input is mobile between the two sectors or 
countries.  These assumptions do not represent a “special case”.  Rather, they are 
generalizations of prior models that assume capital is not mobile, or that firms cannot 
change carbon per unit of output, or that the two goods must be identical. 
Given these conditions, the result is quite easy to explain.  A carbon tax or 
permit price induces firms to abate carbon per unit of output by using more of a clean 
input such as abatement capital.  The taxed sector draws resources away from the 
unregulated sector or region, which reduces their output and emissions.  We call this an 
                                                 
3 As an example of sub-national policy, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a conglomerate 
of Northeastern states in the U.S. that agree to limit their own carbon emission. Wing and Kolodziej 
(2009) find carbon leakage rates of more that 50%, due to electricity imports from non-RGGI states. - 3 - 
 
“abatement resource effect” (ARE).  Its size depends on parameters.  If consumers can 
shift their purchases easily, then positive leakage may be high.  Even then, however, 
leakage may be overstated in models that do not allow for substitution in production.  If 
consumer flexibility is low compared to producers’ ability to abate pollution by use of 
other resources, however, then we show that overall leakage may be negative.  
Given the simplicity of this intuitive result, we wonder why previous literature 
has not identified this effect.  First, some models assume fixed carbon per unit of output 
(with no substitution into a clean input).  Second, some models assume that capital and 
labor are not mobile between countries.  They might assume that factors are mobile 
between sectors within a country but then find effects of a tax on all carbon in that 
country, leaving no scope for firms to draw resources from an untaxed sector.  Third, 
some CGE models may incorporate all three of our key assumptions but then report net 
numerical results, obscuring the fact that our ARE offsets some of the positive leakage.  
In any case, we do not find any paper that derives analytical expressions for leakage in a 
model where firms can substitute into a clean input that is mobile across regions.  
Our intent is to demonstrate this effect using the simplest possible model, not to 
measure actual leakage.  We therefore abstract from many important issues such as 
materials production and intermediate inputs [e.g. Felder and Rutherford (1993)], 
endogenous number of firms [Gurtzgen and Rauscher (2000)], oligopolistic competition 
[Babiker (2005)], and strategic interaction [Fowlie (2009)].
4  Such features could affect 
leakage, but none would remove the ARE in our expressions.  In any model with the 
three assumptions above, results would still include this negative leakage term. 
The next section presents our basic model.  In section 2, we differentiate all 
equations to linearize the model and solve for effects of a small increase in one sector’s 
pollution price.  We identify the abatement resource effect in a closed-form expression 
for the change in carbon leakage.  Section 3 provides a brief numerical example, while 
Section 4 provides further discussion.  We investigate the ARE further, to see whether 
output in the other sector falls because revenue from the increased tax is not enough to 
compensate consumers for the higher price of one good.  In some cases, the additional 
revenue is negative, which itself reduces consumer purchases.   
                                                 
4 Our model is also related to Holland (2009), who shows that welfare gains might be higher with an 
intensity standard than with a tax on emissions, because it causes less increase in the output price and 
therefore less leakage.  Without an overall resource constraint, however, he cannot find negative leakage. - 4 - 
 
1. The Basic Model 
Two competitive sectors (i = X,Y) each use clean input  Ki  and carbon emissions  
Ci  with decreasing marginal products in a constant returns to scale production function,  
) , ( X X C K X X   and  ) , ( Y Y C K Y Y  .  The clean input is mobile and thus earns the 
same return, pK, in either sector.  It can be considered a composite of labor and capital, 
in fixed total supply  Y X K K K   .  Each sector faces its own carbon tax  τi (or permit 
price for carbon).
5  In response to an increased tax on emissions, a firm can reduce its 
carbon per unit of output by additional use of abatement technology, that is, by 
substitution from  Ci  into  Ki.  In the electricity generating sector, for example, firms 
can reduce emissions per kilowatt-hour by investing in natural gas plants, wind turbines, 
or solar power.  All revenue is returned via lump-sum rebate,  Y Y X X C C R     .  
This model omits a type of positive leakage, namely, world trade of fossil fuel in 
fixed supply.  If a taxing country reduces its demand for oil, the fall in the world price 
of oil can increase consumption elsewhere.
6  Instead, consider  τY  on coal-fired power 
plants, where coal is not scarce (its world price depends primarily on extraction cost). 
Emissions from either sector add to total carbon,  Y X C C C   , which negatively 
affects utility in a separable manner.  Many identical households earn income from 
capital and the rebate of revenue, taking as given the total carbon and all market prices 
(pX,  pY , and  pK).  They maximize homothetic utility by choice of  X  and  Y : 
Y p X p R K p t s C Y X U Y X K Y X    . . ) ; , ( max } , { . 
We have no need to specify which sector initially has the higher carbon tax rate, and so 
we simply investigate effects of a small increase in  τY  with no change in  τX.  We 
compare the new long run equilibrium to the initial one, ignoring adjustments during the 
transition.  The increase in  τY  reduces equilibrium emissions in sector  Y, and so 
leakage is defined as the effect on emissions in sector  X. 
                                                 
5 Variable supply of labor or capital (factor K) would not remove negative leakage: whatever the new 
supply of  K,  the use of  K  for abatement in sector  Y  must come at the expense of output  X.  However, 
input  C  is not in fixed total supply in any “market” for carbon (or fossil fuels).  We just assume each 
firm can use any amount of  C,  given the tax rate.  With no uncertainty, however, the resulting choice for 
carbon quantity at tax rate  τ  can equally represent a policy with that number of permits at price  τ.         
6 This other type of leakage might be important with border tax adjustments (BTA), which essentially 
convert a tax on carbon in production to a tax on carbon in consumption.  We model a carbon tax with no 
border tax adjustments, that is, without such effect on the world oil price.  In any case, adding oil as an 
input would change the model, and leakage, but it would not remove the ARE.   
 - 5 - 
 
This simple model can be interpreted at least two ways.  First, it can represent an 
international context where Y is produced in one country or set of countries that raises 
its carbon tax, while  X  is produced in the “rest of world”.  In this case, we suppose that 
all consumers have the same utility function.
7  Capital is owned by these identical 
worldwide consumers, and it can be used to produce either region’s output.  A more 
complete trade model might have both regions produce both outputs, with the same type 
of negative leakage that we identify (so long as firms can substitute into mobile capital).   
Alternatively, the model can represent a closed economy in which only sector Y 
faces a raised price of carbon.  For a concrete example that “best” fits our model, the 
European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) applies to electricity generation 
and major industries, including only 40% of total E.U. greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions.
8  Any agreement between the E.U. and the U.S. or other nations may apply 
GHG or carbon pricing to a similar subset of outputs (with the usual problems of 
aggregation).  This example is particularly appropriate, because electricity has inelastic 
demand, which means low elasticity of substitution in utility – one condition that 
increases the size of negative leakage in our model.  
2. Solving for Equilibrium Effects 
  Given this set-up, we now log-linearize the model to solve for n linear equations 
in n unknowns.  Totally differentiate the resource constraint   Y X K K K   , and use the 
“hat” notation to denote a proportional change in any variable (e.g.  X X X K dK K  ˆ ): 
Y Y X X K K ˆ ˆ 0       (1)
where   K Ki i     is the share of capital in production of  i  (i = X,Y), and  Y X    = 1.   
Then totally differentiate production to show how changes to inputs affect final output: 
X XC X XK C K X ˆ ˆ ˆ       (2)
Y YC Y YK C K Y ˆ ˆ ˆ       (3)
where  ij   is the factor share of income for input  j  in the production of good  i  [e.g. θXK 
                                                 
7 Our model with a single type of worldwide consumer is not adequate to analyze effects on welfare in 
each country, but our goal here is only to look at effects on carbon emissions in each country. 
8 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. - 6 - 
 
≡ (pKKX)/(pXX)].  Then   1   XC XK     and   1   YC YK   .  
  Perfect competition and constant returns to scale imply zero profits, so   
X X X K X C K p X p      and   Y Y Y K Y C K p Y p    .  Totally differentiate these equations 
and use the firm’s profit maximizing first-order conditions: 
    X X XC X K XK X C K p X p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ           (4)
    Y Y YC Y K YK Y C K p Y p ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ           (5)
Each production function has only two inputs, so factor intensity responds to a change 
in relative input prices according to each elasticity of substitution,   X    and   Y  .  We 
define these elasticities to be positive.  Differentiating their definitions yields: 
 X K X X X p K C   ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ      (6)
 . ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
Y K Y Y Y p K C        (7)
  Finally, under the assumption that pollution is separable in utility, we use the 
single parameter   U    to define the elasticity of substitution in utility between   X  and  
Y.  Differentiating the definition of   U    yields: 
 . ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
X Y U p p Y X       (8)
 Suppose    β  is the share of income spent on  Y,  and  ηYY  is the usual own-price 
elasticity of demand (with no change in any other prices).  Then one can easily show  
ηYY = –[β + σU(1–β)].  In other words, a small  σU  can represent the trade-off between  
Y,  a good like electricity with inelastic demand, and all other goods  X. 
Equations (1) – (8) are the log-linear system for general equilibrium effects of a 
small change in policy. We define capital as numeraire ( 0 ˆ  K p ), which leaves the eight 
numbered equations above with eight unknowns (changes in X, Y, their two prices, and 
the four input quantities).  We assume  0 ˆ  X  ,  where   Y ˆ  is a small positive exogenous 
change in tax.  Sector  X  experiences no change in relative input prices  0 ˆ ˆ   K X p  , 
so equation (6) simplifies to  X X K C ˆ ˆ  .  Note, we do not assume Liontief production in 
X.  Those firms have a positive  σX,  but they choose not to alter input ratios because 
they face no relative input price changes.  In addition, unchanged input prices means no 
change in the breakeven output price, so   0 ˆ  X p   [from equations (2) and (4)].  - 7 - 
 
  Next, observe from (3) and (5) that  0 ˆ ˆ   Y YC Y p   .  This additional carbon tax 
always raises the price of  Y  relative to the price of  X.  Further algebra reveals:  
 Y YC Y Y U X Y       ˆ ˆ      (9)
Since all parameters in this equation are positive, the negative sign out front 
means that the increase in  τY  unambiguously reduces output – to an extent that depends 
on substitution elasticities and the carbon share of production.  Algebra also yields: 














             
 
(10)
The second term inside the large brackets is the “substitution effect”, since the 
tax changes relative input prices and induces substitution through the elasticity  σY.  
Firms reduce carbon per unit of output.  Then the first term is just Y ˆ, from (9).  It 
represents an “output effect”, since the tax raises output price and reduces demand, so 
firms further reduce both inputs.  The tax on carbon reduces carbon emissions through 
both of these channels, and so (10) shows that  Y C ˆ  is unambiguously negative. 
Two effects operate in different directions in the other sector, however: 









              (11)
The first effect in (11) is a terms-of-trade effect (TTE), because the higher price of  Y  
induces consumer substitution into  X  (to an extent that depends on  σU).  Alone, it 
would raise production of  X  and therefore raise  CX  (positive leakage).  The other term 
in (11) is what we call the abatement resource effect (ARE).  It depends on  σY, because 
the firms in  Y  substitute from carbon into capital for abatement, and thus bid capital 
away from X.  Since  0 ˆ ˆ   K X p  , those firms choose not to substitute and instead 
reduce both  KX  and  CX.  This term yields negative leakage. 
  Clearly, from (11), the relative size of these offsetting effects depends on the 
relative size of  σU  and  σY.  If consumers can substitute easily between goods, then the 
terms-of-trade effect dominates, and leakage is positive.  This effect would be large for 
the case with international trade in close substitutes.  Using the Armington (1969) 
assumption, for example, then  σU  would be large, and leakage is positive.  Even in that - 8 - 
 
case, however, researchers might overstate leakage if they do not allow for any negative 
effect on leakage through home substitution into abatement capital (the ARE effect).  
  In other cases such as the pricing of carbon permits in the electricity sector, 
demand is inelastic, and so  σU  is small.   If technology allows for abatement per unit of 
output, then  σY  may exceed  σU,  and overall leakage is negative.  In this case, models 
that ignore the ARE would find the wrong sign for overall leakage.  The net effect of 
unilateral pollution regulation could be overall pollution reduction beyond what is 
achieved within the regulating sector, region, or country. 
3. Numerical Magnitudes 
To see the size of these effects, we assign values to parameters and calculate the leakage 
response to a 10% increase in tax   1 . 0 ˆ  Y  .  To calculate  X C ˆ  in (11), however, we 
need four parameters.  First, we set the initial carbon intensity  5 . 0  YC   and allocate 
half of capital to each sector   5 . 0   Y X     Then in figure 1, we show carbon 
leakage on the vertical axis as a function of the elasticity of substitution in production 
 Y  .  The top dotted line in the figure is for  σU =1.5, where leakage declines from 
+4.0% to –1.5% as  σY  varies from zero to 2.0 on the horizontal axis.  Thus negative 
leakage is possible, even with high  σU, but it is more likely with lower  σU.  The middle 
dashed line is for  σU =1.0, and the bottom solid line is for  σU =0.5, where leakage 
declines from +1.0% to –4.0% as  σY  varies from zero to two. 
Perhaps the overall point is clear from equation (11), but figure 1 conveys size 
and makes it visual: negative leakage is possible, and it is made more possible by high 
values of  σY  (where substitution into abatement technology is easier) or low values of  
σU  (where consumers buy nearly as much of the taxed sector’s output).  
4. Discussion 
This analysis raises at least four questions, which we now address.  First, many 
have wondered how factor prices can remain unchanged in sector  X.  Does the 
interpretation depend on the choice of numeraire?  We chose  0 ˆ  K p  as numeraire, and 
we found that  0 ˆ  X p , so the choice of  X  as numeraire would yield exactly the same 
results.  Yet we also assume  0 ˆ  X  , which means that policymakers hold constant the 
tax on carbon in sector  X  relative to either their output price or input price.  Only - 9 - 
 
relative prices matter, so it seems reasonable that the other country would hold constant 
its tax relative to its own prices. Yet, suppose that policymakers were to hold  τX  
constant relative to  pY (or to some overall weighted average price level).  Since pY rises, 
that would raise  τX  relative to our numeraire (pK or pX), which would reduce leakage.  
In this respect, our assumption yields a conservative expression for negative leakage.  
Figure 1 – Carbon Leakage Depends on σY  and σU  [θYC=0.5,  Y X    =0.5,  Y ˆ =0.1] 
 
Second, we find that leakage  X C ˆ  is negative when output declines ( X ˆ <0), but 
how is that consistent with a decline in the relative price of  X?  Recall that  Y p ˆ >0, while 
X p ˆ =0.  Does demand for X have the wrong slope?  No, we can calculate the usual own-
price elasticity of demand for  X  with no change in other prices,  ηXX = –[(1–β) + σUβ], 
which is clearly negative.  A fall in  pX  alone would raise X, partly because it increases 
real income.  In contrast, the increase in  pY  reduces real income and therefore tends to 
decrease world demand for both goods.  In fact, the cross-price elasticity of demand for 
X with respect to a change in  pY  is  ηXY =  β(σU–1), which can have either sign.   
Third, however, consumers receive back all of the tax revenue, so how can this 
compensated increase in  pY/pX  reduce X?  Recall that consumers earn   R K p I K   , 
where  R = τYCY+τXCX.  The answer is that the rebate of revenue is never enough to 
reach the same indifference curve, especially since the increase in the input tax worsens 
production inefficiency, shifting inward the production possibility frontier.  An increase 
in the distorting tax  τY  always reduces the utility from consumption (even if it provides - 10 - 
 
benefits from a better environment).  In fact, increasing deadweight loss from an input 
tax is the reason for a Laffer Curve, where revenue is a hump-shaped function of the tax 
rate.  Initial increases in  τY  may  raise positive revenue, but successive increases yield 
zero and then negative revenue. 
Fourth, we wonder if our negative leakage result is related to this insight about 
the Laffer curve.  Is the sign of   X C ˆ  related to the sign of R ˆ ?  As it turns out, the set of 
parameters for which leakage is negative is not a subset of the parameters for which the 
effect on revenue is negative, nor the other way around. 
Since the capital stock and its price are fixed, the only change to income is the 
change in the rebate of revenue.  We totally differentiate that expression for R and find:  
 Y Y Y Y Y U YC Y Y R          ˆ ) ( ) ( ˆ        (12)
where   R CX X X     ,  R CY Y Y     , and  1   Y X   ; that is,   X    is the share of 
total tax revenue from sector X. 
  To see how the change in revenue and leakage each depend on substitution 
parameters, figure 2 plots  σY  on the horizontal axis and  σU  on the vertical axis.  First 
note that  X C ˆ  in equation (11) has a term (σU –σY) times  Y ˆ , so leakage is zero whenever  
σU =σY  (on the 45 degree dashed line in figure 2).  Leakage is positive to the upper-left 
of that line (with higher  σU) and negative to the lower-right (with higher  σY).     
To find areas for positive or negative changes in revenue in figure 2, we set 
0 ˆ  R  in equation (12) and solve: 

























 1   (13)
This line has a slope that depends on the sign and magnitude of (δY – αY).  If the share of 
tax revenue from sector  Y  exceeds its share of capital (δY >αY), then this slope can be 
negative.  Figure 2 depicts the case where δY = 0.75, and αY = 0.5, using a dotted iso-
revenue line.  To the lower-left, where both  σ  elasticities are small, the increase in  τY  
raises revenue; to the upper right of this line, the larger responsiveness means that an 
increase in  τY  reduces the tax base by enough that revenue falls.  If  δY = αY , then the 
line is vertical, and if  αY > δY  the slope is positive.  The iso-leakage and iso-revenue - 11 - 
 
lines always intersect where  σU  and  σY  both equal one.  In any case, the figure clearly 
shows four different areas: the signs of ( X C ˆ ,R ˆ ) can be (+,+), (+,-), (-,+), or (-,-).  
Figure 2 – Tax in Sector  Y  Yields Most Revenue (δY=0.75, θYC =0.5,  Y X    =0.5) 
 
So far, leakage seems unrelated to revenue.  But suppose the initial  τY  is zero, 
with no revenue from sector  Y  (δY = 0).  Then equation (13) shows that the iso-revenue 
line has an intercept of zero and a slope of one.  In this case, it is coincident with the 
iso-leakage line.  In other words, an initial increase in  τY  from zero necessarily has 
both negative leakage and negative net revenue whenever  σY > σU.  The initial increase 
in τY induces sector Y to substitute into abatement, which draws capital away from 
sector  X.  The output of  X  shrinks, along with both of its inputs.  Less  CX  means 
negative leakage, and it also means less revenue from  τXCX .  
The point of our paper is not that leakage must be negative.  Various extensions 
might reduce the size of our negative leakage effect.  Rather, we show that in some 
cases leakage might be negative.  More importantly, policymakers and economists who 
ignore the abatement resource effect might be overstating the size of carbon leakage.   
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